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WHEN THE PLAIN MEANING OF A STATUTE IS NOT SO
PLAIN: THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
RCRA'S CLARIFICATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD WASTE
EXCLUSION: CITY OF CHCAGO v ENVRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND
I. INTRODUCTION
Municipalities throughout the United States presently dispose
of their solid waste in either of two ways: depositing it in landfills or
burning it in incinerators.' The burning of trash as a means of
waste disposal only became popular within the last fifteen to twenty
years.2 Beginning in the 1970s, the municipal waste combustor,
also known as the incinerator, was promoted as a cleaner, safer and
more efficient alternative to landfills.3
The benefits of incineration include energy produc-
tion4 and the reduction of the volume of municipal solid
1. ALYCE M. UJIaAA & MICHAEL GOUGH, MANAGING ASH FROM MUNICIPAL
WASTE INCINERATORS: A REPORT 2 (1989) [hereinafter MANAGING ASH]; See SENATOR
AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 145-47 (1992) (giving account of America's strug-
gle with choosing means of waste disposal in light of increasing quantities of
trash).
2. James V. Delong, Sackcloth and Ash: City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 24 ENvrL. L. REP. 10536 (Sept., 1994). Waste-to-energy incinerators were
promoted in the 1970's as a response to two crises: the energy crisis and the gar-
bage crisis (scarcity of landfill space). Id.
3. Under the federal statutory scheme regulating the disposal of solid wastes,
Congress lists landfilling as unreliable to assure "long term containment of...
hazardous waste" and, as a result, a "substantial risk to human health and the envi-
ronment." Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA"), Title I, § 101(a) (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901(b) (7) (1988) (SWDA is an amendment to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, §§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6991 (1988)).
Consequently, RCRA mandates the immediate development of alternatives to
landfilling. Id. § 101(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(8) (1988).
4. Not all municipal waste incinerators produce energy. There are two types
of municipal waste incinerators, those that burn waste for energy and those that
bum waste without producing energy. Extension of Date for Submission of Part A
Permit Applications for Facilities Managing Ash From Waste-to-Energy Facilities,
59 Fed. Reg. 29,373 (1994). EPA reports that 80% of the 150 municipal waste
combustors are of the waste-to-energy type. Id. Waste-to-energy incinerators are
also referred to as resource recovery facilities. Throughout this Note, the terms
"incinerator," "waste-to-energy incinerator," and "resource recovery facility" will be
used interchangeably.
Waste-to-energy incinerators produce energy in two different ways. GoRE ,
supra note 1, at 156. In some types of waste-to-energy incinerators, the heat gener-
ated by incineration is used to make steam, which is then sold as energy. Id. In
other types of waste-to-energy incinerators, the solid waste is burned and formed
into pellets of "refuse-derived fuel" which are then burned to fuel the incinerator.
(345)
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waste. 5 The benefit of volume reduction is particularly important
due to the increasing scarcity of landfill space.6 Unfortunately, the
disposal of municipal solid waste by incineration also has its disad-
vantages. Most significantly, the ash residue7 which remains after
incineration may contain toxic levels of chemicals and heavy metals
such as lead and cadmium.8 If this ash is disposed of improperly,
these toxic constituents can leach into the ground water or surface
water supplies.9 Despite this possible risk, the majority of incinera-
tor operators, until very recently, disposed of this ash as non-haz-
ardous waste by dumping it into non-hazardous waste landfills. 10
When disposing of solid wastes, municipalities must comply
with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").1
Hazardous wastes are subject to costly compliance requirements
under Subtitle C,12 while non-hazardous wastes are regulated under
Id.; see also David C. Wartinbee, Comment, Incinerator Ash May Not Be a Hazardous
Waste, But the Story Doesn't End, 9 T.M. CooLEY L. Ray. 115, 116 (1992).
5. Bradley K Groff, Note, Burned-If-We-Do, Burned-IfWe-Don't: Treatment of Mu-
nicipal Solid Waste Incinerator Ash Under RCRA's Household Waste Exclusion, 27 GA. L.
REv. 555 (Winter, 1993). Because the volume of waste can be reduced by 70% to
90% through burning, the need for landfill space is considerably reduced. Id. at
556 (footnote omitted).
6. Id.
7. There are two types of ash which result from incineration, fly ash and bot-
tom ash. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 3. Fly ash is composed of "airborne
particles that are captured by filters in the incinerator stack." Id. Bottom ash de-
scribes "the heavy residue found at the bottom of the incinerator after the munici-
pal solid waste is burned." Id. Fly ash generally contains more toxic constituents
than bottom ash. Wartinbee, supra note 4, at 117. Most incinerators combine bot-
tom and fly ash while it still remains at the facility prior to its disposal. Id. Ash, as
discussed in this Note, shall refer to either bottom ash or bottom ash combined
with fly ash.
8. DeLong, supra note 2, at 3. Contact with low dosages of lead may cause
destructive neurological effects. Cadmium is classified as a carcinogen. War-
tinbee, supra note 4, at 118. EPA has set forth procedures for regulating wastes
that contain these constituents. See 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1993). For further discussion
of EPA regulations pertaining to toxic wastes, see infra note 19.
9. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 2.
10. Groff, supra note 5, at 556. Non-hazardous waste is subject to considerably
less stringent standards under RCRA. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
11. RCRA §§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). RCRA
classifies solid waste as either hazardous or non-hazardous for regulation purposes.
See id., 42 U.S.C. § 6921.
12. RCRA §§ 3001-11, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39(b). Subtitle C requirements are
numerous and complex. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 13-14. Depending on
whether one is a generator or transporter of hazardous waste, the requirements
vary but generally call for identification of wastes, recordkeeping, labeling, using
proper containers, and reporting spills. Furthermore, before handling any haz-
ardous waste, a permit must be obtained from EPA. Id.
Disposal of hazardous waste in a landfill is particularly expensive because Sub-
title C requires all hazardous waste landfills to be equipped with a special liner and
leachate collection system "to prevent movement of toxic substances from the
2
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the less stringent standards of Subtitle D.13 Because household
waste collected by municipalities usually contains small amounts of
hazardous waste that would technically require Subtitle C regula-
tion, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has promul-
gated the "household waste exclusion," an exemption from Subtitle
C for household waste. 14 Thus, under current regulations, the col-
lection and disposal of municipal waste is not normally subject to
Subtitle C requirements. However, under EPA's regulatory scheme,
the incineration of municipal waste has presented a problem be-
cause it is not clear whether incinerator ash remaining after the
burning of household waste is also exempt from Subtitle C. In
1984, Congress passed amendments to RCRA which included a pro-
vision entitled "Clarification of the household waste exclusion."' 5
landfill into groundwater or surface water supplies." Id. at 14. Hazardous waste
landfills are also required to be equipped with monitoring wells which reach into
"the uppermost aquifer underlying the facility." Id. These wells must be constantly
monitored for potential contamination of water supplies. Id. EPA's regulatory
scheme pertaining to hazardous waste generators and transporters is set out in full
at 40 C.F.R. §§ 261-70 (1994).
13. RCRA §§ 4001-09, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49. Regulation of nonhazardous
wastes under Subtitle D is essentially a default provision. The disposal of any
wastes not meeting the definition of "hazardous" under Subtitle C is regulated
under Subtitle D. However, Subtitle C does impose some independent require-
ments on non-hazardous waste disposal sites. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 21.
For example, a non-hazardous waste disposal facility must not contaminate the
underlying drinking water aquifer beyond the boundary of the facility. Id. Also,
the facility must comply with procedures "to minimize disease and improve safety".
Id. But, the liners and groundwater monitoring systems necessary under Subtitle C
are not required under Subtitle D. Id.
14. The "household waste exclusion" provides:
§ 261.4 Exclusions
(b) Solid Wastes which are not hazardous wastes. The following solid
wastes are not hazardous wastes:
(1) Household waste, including household waste that has been col-
lected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g., refuse-de-
rived fuel) or reused. "Household waste" means any material (including
garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in septic tanks) derived from house-
holds, (including single and multiple residences, hotels and motels).
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (1) (1994).
Although household waste is composed of primarily non-hazardous materials,
it does contain small quantities of hazardous wastes such as pesticides and solvents.
Kathleenj. Rutt, Note, Regulating the Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste Incinerator Ash:
The Companion Cases of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies
and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 4 VA.L. ENvrL. LJ. 207, 212
(1993) (footnote omitted).
Municipal solid waste is made up of approximately 50% paper (including
newspaper and various forms of packaging), 20% yard waste, construction wood,
and assorted organic waste, and 10% plastics. GoRE, supra note 1, at 151-52. The
remaining portion is an "unbelievable conglomeration of odds and ends." Id. at
152.
15. RCRA § 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i). This provision reads as follows:
(i) Clarification of household waste exclusion
3
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Because this provision did not explicitly mention incinerator ash,
the regulatory treatment of ash has continued to be a controversial
issue. 16
In City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.,17 the
Supreme Court interpreted the clarification provision to require
regulation of incinerator ash under Subtitle C. Prior to Chicago,
most incinerator operators handled incinerator ash under Subtitle
D.18 This decision will now require testing of incinerator ash and, if
the ash proves to be hazardous, compliance with Subtitle C.19
A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass burning
of municipal solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, dis-
posing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of
regulation under this subchapter if -
(1) such facility
(A) receives and bums only -
(i) household waste (from single and multiple dwellings, hotels, mo-
tels, and other residential sources), and
(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not
contain hazardous waste identified or listed under this section, and
(B) does not accept hazardous wastes identified or listed under this
section, and
(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established contractual
requirements or other appropriate notification or inspection procedures
to assure that hazardous wastes are not received at or burned in such
facility.Id.
16. For additional information concerning this controversy, see supra notes
26-58 and accompanying text.
17. 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Although RCRA is less strin-
gent, there are a few states that required incinerators to handle incinerator ash in
accord with Subtitle C prior to the Chicago decision. See, e.g., South Carolina Commu-
nities Develop 20-Year Waste Management Plans, SOLID WASTE REPORT, Sept. 29, 1994,
at 38 (South Carolina's two incinerators already tested their ash prior to Chicago).
19. DeLong, supra note 2, at 10,536. If the ash contains levels of toxic constit-
uents in excess of the limits set by EPA, then the incinerator ash must be treated to
neutralize its hazardous constituents and then disposed of in a hazardous waste
landfill. Id. at 6.
Nowhere in RCRA or EPA's regulations is there an explicit requirement for
testing. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 19. However, the regulations state that if
the waste is neither exempt from Subtitle C under an enumerated exclusion, nor
listed in the regulations as a hazardous waste, then the waste generator is responsi-
ble for making the determination of whether the waste is hazardous. Id. "This
determination is made by either testing the waste or '[a] pplying knowledge of the
hazard characteristic of the waste in light of the materials or the processes used."
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (c) (2) (1994)). Therefore, prior to the Chicago deci-
sion, incinerator operators applied their knowledge of the "household waste exclu-
sion" to conclude that incinerator ash did not need to be tested. See id. at 19-20.
The test required by EPA is called the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Proce-
dure ("TC") test. DeLong, supra note 2, at 3; see also 40 C.F.R. § 261, App. II
(1994). This test is designed to simulate the conditions in a landfill to determine if
the waste could become soluble and leach to the surrounding water supply. MAN-
AGING ASH, supra note 1, at 20. Liquid extracts from the waste are tested for 40
4
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In examining the Chicago decision, this Note will focus on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress' clarification of the
household waste exclusion and its effects on waste-to-energy incin-
eration as a means of municipal waste disposal.20 Part II of this
Note outlines RCRA, EPA's regulations, and the resulting circuit
split regarding the regulatory treatment of incinerator ash.2 ' Part
III provides the factual setting of Chicago and a narrative analysis of
the Supreme Court's reasoning, explaining how the Court arrived
at its interpretation of the clarification provision.2 2 Part IV critically
analyzes the Court's rationale 23 and Part V discusses both the prac-
tical effects and legal implications of the Court's construction.
24
This Note concludes by calling for congressional action concerning
the specific regulation of incinerator ash so that incineration may
continue as a viable method of municipal waste disposal.
25
specific types of hazardous constituents, including lead and cadmium. See 40
C.F.R. § 261.24 (1994). If the extract contains constituents which exceed the max-
imum levels set by EPA, then the waste has exhibited a toxicity characteristic, and
is classified as a hazardous waste. See id. Incinerator ash fails the TC test if it
leaches lead or cadmium above levels set by EPA. 59 Fed. Reg. 29,374 (1994).
EPA developed the TC test to simplify its predecessor, the Extraction Proce-
dure ("EP") Toxicity test. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 4. For a comparison of
the TC test and its predecessor, the EP Toxicity test to analyze incinerator ash, see
generally MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 3-4, 16-21.
Laboratory tests using the EP Toxicity test produced the following results:
some bottom ash samples tested below the limit for lead and all bottom ash sam-
ples tested below the limit for cadmium while combined ash samples (bottom and
fly ash) largely exceeded the limits for lead, but not for cadmium. Id. at 3-4. For
the distinction between bottom and fly ash, see supra note 7.
20. This Note does not argue that the benefits of incineration as a means of
waste disposal outweigh any environmental costs that may result from incineration.
Rather, this Note provides an analysis of the Court's interpretation of the clarifica-
tion provision and how the Chicago decision will affect incineration. For a policy
based argument that Congress' clarification of the "household waste exclusion"
requires that incinerator ash be regulated as a hazardous waste, see generally Rutt,
supra note 14 (analyzing jurisdictional split concerning regulation of incinerator
ash and conciuding that ash was intended to be regulated as hazardous waste).
21. For the discussion of the legislative and administrative history of incinera-
tor ash, see infra notes 26-72 and accompanying text.
22. For the discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago, see infra
notes 73-118 and accompanying text.
23. For the critical analysis of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chicago, see
infra notes 119-45 and accompanying text.
24. For the discussion of the impact of the Chicago decision, see infra notes
146-59 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislation and Administrative Regulations
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
RCRA governs the disposal of municipal waste.2 6 Enacted by
Congress in 1976, RCRA delegates extensive authority to EPA to
regulate solid waste disposal.2 7 Subtitle D of RCRA provides for
26. RCRA §§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91.
27. RCRA was Congress' response to the country's dwindling landfill capacity
and the threat of landfilling hazardous wastes. Hillary A. Sale, Note, Trash, Ash,
and Interpretation of RCRA, 17 HARv. ENVTm. L. REv. 409, 411 (1993). RCRA's two
primary objectives are to "promote the protection of health and the environment
and to conserve valuable material and energy resources.. .. " RCRA § 1003, 42
U.S.C. § 6902(a).
These goals are based on congressional findings concerning solid waste, envi-
ronment and health, materials, and energy. These findings are enumerated in the
statute as follows:
(a) Solid waste. The Congress finds with respect to solid waste-
(1) that the continuing technological progress and improvement in
methods of manufacture, packaging, and marketing of consumer prod-
ucts has resulted in an ever-mounting increase, and in a change in the
characteristics, of the mass material discarded by the purchaser of such
products;
(2) that the economic and population growth of our Nation, and the
improvements in the standard of living enjoyed by our population, have
required increased industrial production to meet our needs, and have
made necessary the demolition of old buildings, the construction of new
buildings, and the provision of highways and other avenues of transporta-
tion, which, together with related industrial, commercial and agricultural
operations, have resulted in a rising tide of scrap, discarded, and waste
materials;
(3) that the continuing concentration of our population in expanding
metropolitan and other urban areas has presented these communities
with serious financial, management, intergovernmental, and technical
problems in the disposal of solid wastes resulting from the industrial,
commercial, domestic, and other activities carried on in such areas;
(4) that while the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue
to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies, the
problems of waste disposal as set forth above have become a matter na-
tional in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action through
financial and technical assistance and leadership in the development,
demonstration, and application of new and improved methods and
processes to reduce the amount of waste and unsalvageable materials and
to provide for proper and economical solid waste disposal practices.
(b) Environment and Health. The Congress finds with respect to the
environment and health, that-
(1) although land is too valuable a national resource to be needlessly
polluted by discarded materials, most solid waste is disposed of on land in
open dumps and sanitary landfills;
(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land without
careful planning and management can present a danger to human health
and the environment;
(3) as a result of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.], the Water
Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.], and other Federal and
[Vol. VI: p. 345
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state regulation of non-hazardous solid waste under federal guide-
lines.28 If a solid waste is deemed to be hazardous under
established EPA guidelines, then such waste becomes subject to
regulations under Subtitle C.29
State laws respecting public health and the environment, greater
amounts of solid waste (in the form of sludge and other pollution treat-
ment residues) have been created. Similarly, inadequate and environ-
mentally unsound practices for the disposal or use of solid waste have
created greater amounts of air and water pollution and other problems
for the environment and for health;
(4) open dumping is particularly harmful to health, contaminates drink-
ing water from underground and surface supplies, and pollutes the air
and the land;
(5) the placement of inadequate controls on hazardous waste manage-
ment will result in substantial risks to human health and the
environment;
(6) if hazardous waste management is improperly performed in the first
instance, corrective action is likely to be expensive, complex, and time
consuming;
(7) certain classes of land disposal facilities are not capable of assuring
long-term containment of certain hazardous wastes, and to avoid substan-
tial risk to human health and the environment, reliance on land disposal
should be minimized or eliminated, and land disposal, particularly land-
fill and surface impoundment, should be the least favored method for
managing hazardous wastes; and
(8) alternatives to existing methods of land disposal must be developed
since many of the cities in the United States will be running out of suita-
ble solid waste disposal sites within five years unless immediate action is
taken.
(c) Materials. The Congress finds with respect to materials, that-
(1) millions of tons of recoverable material which could be used are
needlessly buried each year;
(2) methods are available to separate usable materials from solid waste;
and
(3) the recovery and conservation of such materials can reduce the de-
pendence of the United States on foreign resources and reduce the defi-
cit in its balance of payments.
(d) Energy. The Congress finds with respect to energy, that-
(1) solid waste represents a potential source of solid fuel, oil, or gas that
can be converted into energy,
(2) the need exists to develop alternative energy sources for public and
private consumption in order to reduce our dependence on such sources
as petroleum products, natural gas, nuclear and hydroelectric genera-
tion; and
(3) technology exists to produce usable energy from solid waste.
Id. § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901.
28. RCRA §§ 4001-09, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49.
29. Id. §§ 3001-11, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-34. Under section 6921(a), EPA is re-
quired to "develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the characteristics of
hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous waste ...." Id. § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921(a). Based on these criteria, EPA is then required to "promulgate regula-
tions identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and listing particular haz-
ardous wastes . . . which shall be subject to the provisions of [Subtitle C]." Id.
§ 3001(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(1). For a discussion of the procedures used to
test for listed hazardous constituents, see supra note 19.
7
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2. Exemptions from Subtitle C Regulation
In 1980, EPA promulgated regulations for hazardous and non-
hazardous waste pursuant to RCRA's classification.30 There are two
methods of identifying a hazardous waste under these regulations.
First, the regulations list certain wastes that are inherently hazard-
ous due to their composition. 31 Second, even if a waste does not
appear on this list, it may still be subject to hazardous waste regula-
tion if it exhibits certain characteristics.3 2 Even when a material is
determined hazardous by one of the above methods, EPA provides
exemptions for certain materials from Subtitle C regulation.33
Therefore, although a material may exhibit characteristics that
would otherwise require hazardous waste classification, it still may
escape Subtitle C regulation.
One of these exemptions, the "household waste exclusion,"3 is
at the heart of the dispute as to whether incinerator ash is to be
regulated as a hazardous waste. This exclusion releases municipali-
ties and households from the requirements of Subtitle C with re-
spect to the disposal of household waste.35 Because household
In addition, those materials which are classified as hazardous must come
within the definition of "hazardous waste" as set out by RCRA:
The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid
wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemi-
cal, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or dis-
posed of, or otherwise managed.
RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
30. RCRA directs EPA to classify solid waste as either hazardous or non-haz-
ardous and to establish controls over the disposition of these wastes pursuant to
this classification. See RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921.
31. 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.33(f) (1994).
32. These characteristics are listed as follows: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity
or toxicity. 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-.24 (1994).
For an explanation of the testing procedures EPA has devised to determine if
these characteristics are present, see supra note 19.
33. These exemptions, or exclusions, from Subtitle C regulation are listed at
40 C.F.PR § 261.4 (1994).
Included in the list of exempted materials are the following: "agricultural
wastes, mining wastes, ash from coal or other fossil-fuel combustion, and small-
quantity generator wastes." MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 15. Household wastes
are also exempt from Subtitle C regulation. Id.
34. The original exemption promulgated by EPA appeared at 45 Fed. Reg.
33,120 (1980) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. 261.4(b) (1) (1994)). This ex-
emption is commonly referred to as the "household waste exclusion." For the text
of this exclusion, see supra note 14.
35. For an explanation of what constitutes "household waste," see supra note
8
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waste contains small quantities of hazardous waste constituents as
well as metals that may become hazardous after burning, the
"household waste exclusion" is essential in exempting municipali-
ties from the stringent requirements of Subtitle C regulation.3 6
After incineration, toxic concentrations of lead and cadmium
have been found in the resulting incinerator ash.37 If residual in-
cinerator ash is not properly handled, its toxic constituents may
leach into surrounding groundwater or surface water supplies.38
The preamble to the 1980 regulations explicitly directed that the
household waste exemption be applied to "treatment residuals,"
such as ash resulting from the burning of household waste.39 How-
ever, ambiguity still existed because it was not clear whether the
ash resulting from the burning of household waste combined with
industrial non-hazardous waste fell within the "household waste
exclusion."40
This uncertainty regarding the regulation of incinerator ash
led Congress to enact the "Clarification of the Household Waste
Exclusion," a 1984 amendment to RCRA.41 This clarification pro-
vided that a waste-to-energy incinerator that burns only household
waste and non-hazardous commercial and industrial waste will not
be subject to hazardous waste regulation requirements of "treating,
storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes."42
This exemption would apply as long as incinerators had procedures
36. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Household waste contains met-
als which may not be hazardous when burned but, after the incineration process,
become concentrated at toxic levels. MANAGING AsH, supra note 1, at 2.
37. MANAGING AH, supra note 1, at 2, 9. See supra note 19.
38. MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 2.
39. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,099 (1980). This preamble stated in relevant part that
'residues remaining after treatment (e.g. incineration, thermal treatment) [of
household waste] are not subject to regulation as a hazardous waste." Id.
40. See DeLong, supra note 2, at 4.
41. RCRA § 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (i) [hereinafter referred to as the "Clari-
fication Provision"]. For the text of this provision, see supra note 15. This provi-
sion was part of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221.
42. Jane Ellen Warner, The Household Waste Exclusion Clarification; 42 U.S.C.
Section 6921(i): Did Congress Intend to Exclude Municipal Solid Waste Ash from Regula-
tion as Hazardous Waste Under Subtitle C?, 16 W. Naw ENG. L. REv. 149, 150
(1994) (footnote omitted).
RCRA provides statutory definitions of the different activities which are enu-
merated in the clarification provision, namely "treatment," "storage," "disposal,"
and "hazardous waste management". See RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903. These
terms are defined as follows:
As used in this chapter:(3) The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dump-
ing, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into
or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any
19951
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in place that insured hazardous commercial and industrial wastes
were not being received along with the household and non-hazard-
ous commercial wastes. 43 Although this provision expanded the ex-
emption to cover waste-to-energy facilities burning household
wastes and non-hazardous commercial wastes, Congress failed to
specifically mention ash residue.44 The legislative history to this
amendment indicated, however, that all activities of a waste-to-en-
ergy facility were covered by the exclusion.45
constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
(7) The term "hazardous waste management" means the systematic con-.
trol of the collection, source separation, storage, transportation, process-
ing, treatment, recovery, and disposal of hazardous wastes.
(33) The term "storage," when used in connection with hazardous waste,
means the containment of hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis
or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of
such hazardous waste.
(34) The term "treatment," when used in connection with hazardous
waste, means any method, technique, or process .... designed to change
the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any haz-
ardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
non-hazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for
storage, or reduced in volume. Such term includes any activity or
processing designed to change the physical form or chemical composi-
tion of hazardous waste so as to render it non-hazardous.
Id.
The statute does not explicitly define the phrase "otherwise managing." The
term "hazard6us waste management" has been used by some courts as a substitute.
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.,
725 F. Supp. 758, 764 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991).
For a discussion of these definitions with respect to the Chicago Court's statu-
tory interpretation of the clarification provision, see infra notes 98-102, 121-27 and
accompanying text.
43. RCRA § 3001 (i) (2), 42 U.S.C. 6921 (i) (2).
44. Compare supra note 14 (providing text of "household waste exclusion")
with supra note 15 (providing text of "clarification of household waste exclusion").
45. S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1983). The Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works commented on the proposed clarification with
respect to these activities, stating that the entire waste stream was excluded from
hazardous waste regulation. Id. (waste stream refers to the management of waste
from its source to its final disposal). The Senate Committee's comments read as
follows:
The reported bill adds a subsection (d) to section 3001 [codified at
42 U.S.C. § 6921(i)] to clarify the coverage of the household waste exclu-
sion with respect to resource recovery facilities recovering energy
through the mass burning of municipal solid waste. This exclusion was
promulgated by the Agency [EPA] in its hazardous waste management
regulations established to exclude waste streams generated by consumers
at the household level and by sources whose waste are sufficiently similar
in both quantity and quality to those of households.
10
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Following Congress' adoption of the clarification provision,
EPA promulgated a regulation that codified the clarification provi-
sion.46 This regulation textually mirrored the RCRA clarification
provision. 47 In its preamble to the regulation, EPA stated that it
interpreted the statute and the rule to exempt incinerator facilities,
but not incinerator ash, from Subtitle C regulation. 48 However, at
Resource recovery facilities often take in such "household wastes"
mixed with other, non-hazardous waste streams from a variety of sources
other than "households," including small commercial and industrial
sources, schools, hotels, municipal buildings, churches, etc. It is impor-
tant to encourage commercially viable resource recovery facilities and to
remove impediments that may hinder their development and operation.
New section 3001(d) [42 U.S.C. § 6921 (i)] clarifies the original intent to
include within the household waste exclusion activities of a resource re-
covery facility which recovers energy from the mass burning of household
waste and non-hazardous waste from other sources.
All waste management activities of such a facility, including the gen-
eration, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of waste shall be
covered by the exclusion, if the limitations in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (d) are met. First, such facilities must receive and burn only
household waste and solid waste from other sources which does not con-
tain hazardous waste identified or listed under 3001 [section 3001 codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 6921].
Second, such facilities cannot accept hazardous wastes identified or
listed under section 3001 [42 U.S.C. § 6921] from commercial or indus-
trial sources, and must establish contractual requirements or other notifi-
cation or inspection procedures to assure that such wastes are not
received or burned. This provision requires precautionary measures or
procedures which can be shown to be effective safeguards against the un-
intended acceptance of hazardous waste. If such measures are in place, a
resource recovery facility whose activities would normally be covered by
the household waste exclusion should not be penalized for the occa-
sional, inadvertent receipt and burning hazardous material from such
commercial or industrial sources. Facilities must monitor the waste they
receive and, if necessary, revise the precautionary measures they establish
to assure against the receipt of such hazardous waste.
Id.
The House Conference Committee adopted the amendment exactly as it was
set forth by the Senate Committee. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
79, 106 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5649, 5677. The House Com-
mittee's Report stated the following with respect to the clarification provision:
"The Senate amendment clarifies that an energy recovery facility is exempt from
hazardous waste requirements if it bums only residential and non-hazardous com-
mercial wastes and establishes procedures to assure hazardous wastes will not be
burned at the facility." Id. With respect to the purposes of RCRA generally, the
Committee Report expressed the Conferees intent that "advanced treatment, re-
cycling, incineration and other hazardous waste control technologies should re-
place land disposal." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 80
(1984).
46. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (1) (1994).
47. For the text of the clarification provision, see supra note 15.
48. The preamble to these regulations reads as follows:
The statute is silent as to whether hazardous residues from burning
combined household and non-household, non-hazardous waste are haz-
11
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the time these regulations were promulgated, EPA did not an-
nounce whether incinerator operators were required to obtain haz-
ardous waste permits as required by Subtitle C. 49
EPA issued varying interpretations of the clarification provision
for the remainder of the decade.50 The agency vacillated between
the view that ash should be regulated as a hazardous waste if it ex-
hibits hazardous waste characteristics and the view that Congress
never intended to regulate incinerator operators under the strin-
gent provisions of Subtitle C.51 Just prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Chicago,52 in an internal memorandum issued in Sep-
tember, 1992, EPA Administrator Reilly declared incinerator ash to
ardous waste. These residues would be hazardous wastes under present
EPA regulations if they exhibited a characteristic. The legislative history
does not directly address this question, although the Senate Report can
be read as enunciating a general policy of non-regulation of these re-
source recovery facilities if they carefully scrutinize their incoming wastes.
On the other hand, residues from burning could, in theory, exhibit a
characteristic of hazardous waste even if no hazardous wastes are burned,
for example, if toxic metals become concentrated in the ash. Thus, the
requirement of scrutiny of incoming wastes would not assure non-hazard-
ousness of the residue. EPA believes that the principal purpose of [the
clarification provision] was to prevent resource recovery facilities that
may inadvertently burn hazardous waste, despite good faith efforts to
avoid such a result, from becoming subject to the Subtitle C regulations.
EPA does not see in this provision an intent to exempt the regulation of
incinerator ash from the burning of non-hazardous waste in resource re-
covery facilities if the ash routinely exhibits a characteristic of hazardous
waste. However, EPA has no evidence to indicate that these ash residues
are hazardous under existing rules. EPA does not believe the HSWA
[Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 containing the clarifi-
cation provision] impose new regulatory burdens on resource recovery
facilities that burn household and other non-hazardous waste, and the
Agency has no plans to impose additional responsibilities on these facili-
ties. Given the highly beneficial nature of resource recovery facilities, any
future additional regulation of their residues would have to await consid-
eration of the important technical and policy issues that would be posed
in the event serious questions arise about the residues.
50 Fed. Reg. 28,702, 28,725-26 (1985).
49. Id. For commentary detailing EPA's inconsistent statements regarding in-
cinerator ash within the RCRA regulations, see Sale, supra note 27, at 415-18 (ex-
plaining EPA's cautious yet confused approach to incinerator ash immediately
following Congress' enactment of clarification provision).
50. For a detailed account of EPA's wavering position on the status of inciner-
ator ash, see MANAGING ASH, supra note 1, at 15-16. See also Rutt, supra note 14, at
214-15; Warner, supra note 42, at 156-58; Sale, supra note 27, at 415-18; 59 Fed.
Reg. 29,374 (1994).
51. For an explanation of EPA testing procedure with respect to incinerator
ash, see supra note 19.
52. For a discussion of the Court's decision in Chicago, see supra notes 87-118
and accompanying text.
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be exempt from Subtitle C regulation. 53 This pronouncement
came after the regulation of incinerator ash had been considered
by both the Second and Seventh Circuits.54
A resolution of the incinerator ash problem also continued to
elude Congress. After enactment of the 1984 clarification provi-
sion, numerous bills were proposed that would have explicitly ex-
empted incinerator ash from Subtitle C regulation.55 None of these
bills ever became law.56 In the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
Congress established a two year moratorium on the regulation of
ash as a hazardous waste under RCRA.57 Since this moratorium,
there has been no legislation regarding the regulatory treatment of
incinerator ash.58
53. Memorandum Issued by Administrator of EPA, William K. Reilly re: Ex-
emption for Municipal Waste Combustion Ash From Hazardous Waste Regulation
under RCRA Section 3001(i), September 18, 1992 [hereinafter Memorandum].
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered this memo-
randum to be only another policy change to add to a long history of waffling by
EPA. See Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago, 985 F.2d 303, 304 (7th
Cir. 1993) (considering incinerator ash issue on remand in light of September,
1992 EPA memorandum), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct.
1588 (1994).
54. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, 931
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 946 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991).
55. See Warner, supra note 42, at 158 n.65 ("In the first three weeks of the first
session of the 102nd Congress, over 11 amendments or reauthorization bills were
introduced.") (citing Steve Johnson, Recyclable Materials and RCRA's Complicated,
Conflicting, and Costly Definition of Solid Waste, 21 ENvrL. L. RP. (ENVrL. L. INST.)
10,357, 10,358 n.10 (July, 1991)); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 29,374 (1994) (describing
regulatory and legislative developments concerning incinerator ash).
56. See Warner, supra note 42, at 158 n.64.
57. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, at 306 (expired
1992). The relevant text of this amendment reads as follows: "For a period of 2
years after the date of enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, ash
from solid waste incineration units burning municipal waste shall not be regulated
by the Administrator of the [EPA] pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act." Id.
The reasons Congress further delayed a decision on incinerator ash were not
made entirely clear. Warner, supra note 43, at 158 nn. 64 & 66 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, it is presumed that the ongoing litigation was influential in
Congress' decision to delay legislative action. See id. at 158 n.66 (expressing view
that Congress may have been awaiting outcomes of Wheelabrator and Chicago
litigation).
58. There have been bills proposed which would require testing of incinera-
tor ash. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 2017, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). However, none of
these bills have been enacted.
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B. Adjudication of the Incinerator Ash Issue
Against this backdrop of legislative and regulatory confusion,
the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") 59 brought companion
lawsuits against two incinerator operators, the City of Chicago6° and
Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.61 In these lawsuits, EDF alleged
that the defendants' handling of incinerator ash as a non-hazardous
waste violated Subtitle C of RCRA.
The issue in both cases was one of statutory interpretation,
namely, whether the clarification provision exempted the ash re-
maining after burning municipal solid waste from Subtitle C regula-
tion. 62 The incinerator-operator defendants argued that the
"household waste exclusion" exempted all activities of incinerator
operators, including the disposal of the remaining ash, from the
restrictive provisions of Subtitle C.69 EDF argued that the exemp-
tion only applied to the treatment, storage and disposal of munici-
pal solid waste itself, not the incinerator ash that remained after
burning. 64
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies,
Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held incinerator ash to be exempt from Subtitle C regu-
lation based on the legislative history of RCRA.65 Examining the
59. The Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") is a non-profit membership
organization which "characterizes itself as 'a national environmental advocacy or-
ganization supported by the dues of 60,000 dues-paying members."' Wheelabrator
725 F. Supp. at 761 (citing plaintiff's brief).
60. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419
(N.D. 111. 1989), rev'd, 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct.
2992 (1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
61. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 758.
62. See RCRA § 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i). For the text of the clarification
provision, see supra note 15.
63. See Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 (defendant, Wheelabrator Technolo-
gies, argued that "otherwise managing" language in clarification provision was
broad enough to exempt all waste disposal activities of municipal incinerator op-
erators); Chicago, 727 F. Supp. at 421 (Chicago contended "that the ash remaining
after incineration at the Northwest facility is from a non-hazardous waste stream
and thus exempt from hazardous waste regulation.").
64. See Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 763; Chicago, 727 F. Supp. at 420-21. In
both cases, EDF alleged that incinerator ash is a hazardous waste and that the
defendants "failed to comply with the cradle-to-grave regulatory system (Subtitle
C) that governs storage, transport, disposal, and other handling of hazardous
wastes." Chicago, 727 F. Supp. at 420-21; Wheelabrator, 727 F. Supp. at 760-61. EDF
specifically argued in both cases based on the statutory definitions of the ex-
empted activities in the clarification provision, asserting that none of these activi-
ties covered the "generation of hazardous waste." See Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at
764 n.13; Chicago, 727 F. Supp. at 422.
65. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764-66. The court disagreed with both the
plaintiff, EDF, and the defendant, Wheelabrator Technologies, stating that the lan-
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Senate Report, the court determined that generating incinerator
ash was exempted by the clarification provision.6 6 The Wheelabrator
court refused to defer to EPA's 1985 interpretation of the clarifica-
tion provision because it was "in direct conflict with the expressed
intent of Congress as... manifested in the legislative history."67 On
guage of the clarification provision was dear. Id. at 767-68 ("The very basic ques-
tion of whether or not ash should be regulated under Subtitle D, as a solid waste,
or under subtitle C as a hazardous waste, remains ambiguous in the statute.").
66. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764-65. The court stated, "[t]he report...
makes clear that the exclusion was meant to extend to ash and other wastes gener-
ated in the process of resource recovery.... The Senate report could not be more
explicit." Id. at 765. For the text of this Senate report, see supra note 45.
67. Id. at 766. The EPA interpretation that the court was referring to was the
1985 preamble to EPA's regulations. For the text of this preamble, see supra note
48.
The court explained that an administrative agency's interpretation is normally
entitled to deference but, in this case, that principle would not apply because
EPA's interpretation conflicted with congressional intent as expressed in the stat-
ute's legislative history. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985)) (standing for the proposition that "an agency's construc-
tion of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reason-
able and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress.")) Congressional
intent was sufficiently clear in the legislative history so as to preclude the adminis-
trative agency's interpretation. Id. The court characterized EPA's interpretations
as "internally inconsistent" and incomplete because EPA left open certain ques-
tions such as how incinerator ash was to be regulated if it was not a hazardous
waste. Id. at 766 n.14.
Additionally, the Wheelabrator court noted that deference to an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute is only appropriate if "Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue." Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). Therefore, according to the court,
the Chevron principles requiring judicial deference to an administrative agency's
interpretation of a statute were not applicable here. See id.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth the following principles:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the ques-
tion whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be neces-
sary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). The Chevron court also stated:
[tihe judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent [citations omitted].... If a court, employing tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an in-
tention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and
must be given effect.
Id. at 843 n.9. For additional case law concerning the judicial review of an adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of a statute, see Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation,
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appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that
the incinerator ash could be disposed of as a non-hazardous
waste.6
8
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois also held that incinerator
ash was exempt from Subtitle C regulation.6 9 On appeal, however,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that inciner-
ator ash was subject to Subtitle C regulation.70
These two lawsuits created a split in authority between the sec-
ond and seventh circuits on the incinerator ash issue.7' This con-
flict of authority posed potentially serious problems for incinerator
operators across the country. While incinerators in the Seventh
Circuit were required to dispose of their ash in accordance with the
rigorous requirements of Subtitle C, those in the Second Circuit
could dispose of their ash in standard non-hazardous waste land-
fills. Moreover, this circuit split created uncertainty for the inciner-
ators in other areas of the country. 72 Therefore, it was incumbent
upon the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether the ash
remaining after the burning of municipal solid waste was regulated
under Subtitle C of RCRA.
Supreme Court's View as to Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent Judicial Construc-
tio, to Prior Administrative Construction of Statute, 39 L. ED. 2d 942 (1993).
68. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213. At the district court level, Judge Haight is-
sued an opinion setting forth "his findings of fact and conclusions of law," prior to
entering finaljudgment. Id. Subsequently, the district court decided to delay final
judgment pending further discovery. Ultimately, the district court granted sum-
maryjudgment for the defendant in an unreported opinion. See Wheelabrator, 931
F.2d at 212. EDF appealed this decision to the Second Circuit which affirmed the
district court's judgment for the reasons stated in District Court Judge Haight's
initial reported opinion, referring to that opinion as "thorough and well rea-
soned." Id. at 213 (citing Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 758).
The Supreme Court denied EDF's petition for writ of certiorari on November
18, 1991. Wheelabrator 112 S. Ct. at 453. For a thorough discussion and critique of
the reasoning of the Wheelabrator court, see Rutt, supra note 14, at 212-19.
69. Chicago, 727 F. Supp. at 424. The court granted the city's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id.
70. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reason-
ing, see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71. For a detailed discussion of both of these cases and the jurisdictional split
they created, see Rutt, supra note 14.
72. There were concerns that if incinerator ash were adjudicated to be a haz-
ardous waste, there might be retroactive liability for the period of time that ash was
disposed of in non-hazardous waste landfills. See infra note 155 and accompanying
text.
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III. C=y oF CHICAGO V. EWVRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUMD, INC.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Since 1971, the City of Chicago owned and operated a munici-
pal solid waste resource recovery facility, the Northwest Waste-to-
Energy Facility.7 3 This incinerator burned municipal solid waste for
the recovery of energy, leaving an ash residue. 74 When the munici-
pal waste was received at the facility, it consisted of regular house-
hold waste and non-hazardous commercial waste. 75 After this waste
was burned by the facility, the remaining ash was taken to landfills
that were not licensed to receive hazardous waste. 76 EDF alleged
that this ash contained toxic levels of lead and cadmium, which are
hazardous wastes under RCRA.77 Neither Chicago, nor the waste
hauler who transported the ash, applied for or received an EPA
identification number as required by Subtitle C of RCRA for those
who handle hazardous wastes. 78
EDF brought an action against the City of Chicago in the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Chi-
cago violated Subtitle C of RCRA by disposing of incinerator ash as
a non-hazardous waste.7 9 Chicago filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that its municipal incinerator was exempted
from Subtitle C under the "household waste exemption."80 The dis-
trict court granted Chicago's motion for summary judgment, agree-
ing that the clarification provision exempted the incinerator ash
from Subtitle C.8 '
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court, holding that the incinerator ash was subject to Subti-
tle C regulation as a hazardous waste.82 In February, 1992, Chicago
73. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1589.
74. Id. The facility burns approximately 350,000 tons of solid waste annually
while producing energy which is used by the facility itself and sold to outsiders. Id.
75. Respondents Brief, at 9, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chi-
cago, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
76. Respondents' Brief, supra note 75, at 10.
77. Id. at 9; see also Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1589. The City did not contest EDF's
claim that the ash contained hazardous constituents, Respondents' Brief, at 9, nor
did it contest the claim that it was not complying with Subtitle C requirements.
Chicago 114 S. Ct. at 1589.
For an explanation of the toxicity of lead and cadmium, see supra note 8.
78. Respondents' Brief, supra note 75, at 10.
79. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1589.
80. Id. For the text of the clarification provision, see supra note 15.
81. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1589-90.
82. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352. The court reasoned that "[iut does not follbw
that the generation of hundreds of tons of a whole new substance with the charac-
teristic of a hazardous waste should be exempt from regulation just because Con-
1995]
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petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
Pending this petition, EPA Administrator Reilly issued an internal
memorandum instructing Regional EPA Administrators to treat in-
cinerator ash as exempt from RCRA Subtitle C regulation.83 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted the city's petition, vacated the
decision of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for recon-
sideration in light of the EPA's newly expressed position. 84 On re-
mand, the Seventh Circuit reinstated its previous opinion.85
The City once again petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. The writ was granted and, on a vote of 7-2, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's holding that the clarification
provision does not exempt incinerator ash from Subtitle C
regulation.8 6
B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court at last ruled on the question of whether
incinerator ash was exempted from Subtitle C regulation.87 Faced
with an issue of statutory interpretation, the Court primarily based
its construction of the clarification provision on what it called the
"plain meaning" of the provision's language.88
1. Plain Meaning
EDF argued that while the plain language of the clarification
provision exempts the receipt and incineration of municipal solid
waste from Subtitle C regulation, the generation of the remaining
ash is not included in this exemption.8 9 The petitioner, the City of
gress wanted to spare individual households and municipalities from a
complicated regulatory scheme if they inadvertently handled hazardous waste." Id.
at 351.
The court also emphasized that the term "generation" was not included in the
definition of hazardous waste management. Id. at 352.
83. Memorandum, supra note 53.
84. See Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992).
85. Chicago, 985 F.2d at 304. The Seventh Circuit discounted the memoran-
dum, stating, "EPA has changed its view so often that it is no longer entitled to the
deference normally accorded an agency's interpretation of the statute it adminis-
ters." Id.
86. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1594. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion.
Justice Stevens was joined by Justice O'Connor in the dissenting opinion. Id. at
1589.
87. Id. at 1588.
88. Id. at 1591. For the text of the clarification provision, see supra note 15.
89. Respondents' Brief, supra note 75, at 12. EDF also argued that Chicago's
proposed construction of the clarification provision cannot be squared with the
structure and purpose of RCRA because, under RCRA, Congress subordinated the
promotion of incinerators to environmental protection. Id. EDF rejected the use
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Chicago, also urged the Court to examine the plain language of the
clarification provision.90 Chicago maintained that the language ex-
empts all waste management activities of a resource recovery facility
from Subtitle C regulation, including the generation of ash.91
The Court began its analysis by looking at the original house-
hold waste exclusion in the 1980 EPA regulations. 92 The Court ac-
knowledged that under this exclusion, an incinerator burning only
household waste can dispose of its ash as non-hazardous waste, not-
ing, however, that Chicago did not limit its incinerator to the burn-
ing of household waste.93 Therefore, the Court concluded that
EPA's 1980 regulations did not exempt Chicago's facility from Sub-
title C regulation if the ash was sufficiently toxic. 94
The Court did not seek any guidance on the interpretation of
the clarification provision from EPA or its regulations. There was
no deference given to EPA's interpretation of the statute under the
principles established by Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
of the legislative history in the interpretation of the statute because it contended
that legislative history cannot be used to add to a statute language that has clearly
been omitted. Id. EDF asserted that no deference should be given EPA's latest
position on incinerator ash.because congressional intent was clear. Id. at 12-13.
90. Brief for Petitioners, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chi-
cago, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief]. Chicago also argued
that the darification provision's legislative history evinced Congress' intent to ex-
empt all activities of municipal waste incinerators. Id. at 13; see supra note 45 and
accompanying text. Additionally, Chicago contended that exempting ash is consis-
tent with RCRA as a whole and the objectives behind it as evidenced by the con-
gressional findings enumerated by the statute. Petitioners' Brief, supra, at 12; see
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
In the alternative, Chicago argued that if the Court were to find the clarifica-
tion ambiguous, the Court should defer to EPA's interpretation of the statute as
set forth in EPA's September, 1992 internal memorandum. Petitioners' Brief,
supra, at 13; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
91. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 90, at 11. This argument was based on the
statutory definitions provided in RCRA. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
92. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1590-91. For the text of this regulation, see supra
note 14.
The Court briefly described EPA's stringent Subtitle C requirements. Chicago,
114 S. Ct. at 1590. Hazardous waste generators and transporters are required "to
comply with handling, record-keeping, storage, and monitoring requirements."
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 262 (1993)). Owners and operators of hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities ("TSDF's"), however, are held to even
more stringent standards, "including a 4-to-5 year permitting process." Id. at 1590
(citing RCRA §§ 3002-05, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-25). For a general discussion of
RCRA, see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
93. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1591.
94. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3, 261.24 (1993)). The Court stated that if the
ash tested pursuant to EPA regulations were found to be toxic, Chicago's facility
would be deemed a hazardous waste generator for purposes of regulation. Id.
The Court noted that the facility would still not be designated a TSDF because all
incoming waste would still be classified as non-hazardous. Id.
19951 363
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fense Council, Inc.,95 because in the Court's opinion, EPA's interpre-
tation went "beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity" the
clarification contained. 96
The Court then examined the language of the clarification
provision, concluding that there was no express support for Chi-
cago's claim that this language exempted the incinerator's entire
waste stream from Subtitle C regulation.97 In addressing Chicago's
arguments, the Court repeatedly referred back to this conclusion.
2. Statutory Definitions
Next, the Court looked at the statutory definitions of the activi-
ties exempted by the clarification provision.98 Chicago contended
that application of RCRA's statutory definitions to the terms used in
the clarification provision indicated that every activity of a resource
recovery facility was covered by the exemption. 99 However, the
Court adopted a different analysis of the RCRA definitions. In
agreeing with EDF, the Court described incineration that leaves ash
containing toxic constituents as "hazardous waste generation," a
term defined by RCRA 00 but conspicuously omitted from the cate-
gory of exempted activities under the clarification provision. 10 Re-
lying on this omission, the Court reasoned that the plain language
95. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For an application of Chewron to the Chicago case, see
supra note 67.
96. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1594; see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 531 (1993) (declining to defer to
administrative agency's interpretation because it exceeded scope of available
ambiguity).
97. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1591. The Court stated that since incinerator ash is
not mentioned in the clarification provision, the household waste exemption ap-
plies only to municipal waste facilities, but does not extend to incinerator ash. Id.
The Court then compared the clarification provision to the 1980 regulations,
where the preamble explicitly provided that ash residue was exempt. Id. at 1591-
92. This distinction, along with the statute's "express national policy," provided
further support for the Court's conclusion that ash which is toxic cannot be dis-
posed of in non-hazardous waste landfills. Id.
98. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1592. For the text of these definitions, see supra note
42.
99. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 90, at 12. "Everything that a resource recov-
ery facility does to the municipal waste it bums [storing, treating, managing, col-
lecting, transporting, or disposal] is covered by the words found in [the
clarification provision]." Id.
100. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1592. RCRA defines "hazardous waste generation"
as "the act or process of producing hazardous waste." RCRA § 1004(6), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(6).
101. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1592-93.
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of the clarification provision did not exempt incinerator ash from
Subtitle C regulation.10 2
3. Legislative History
Chicago argued that the legislative history of the clarification
provision clearly supported its position that all activities engaged in
by resource recovery facilities were exempt.10 3 The Court briefly
addressed and rejected this argument, stating that "it is the statute
and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expres-
sion of the law, and the statute prominently omits reference to
generation."10 4
In addressing Chicago's argument that EDF's interpretation
would turn the clarification into an "empty gesture," the Court
stated that the clarification, interpreted not to exempt ash, accom-
plished two things.' 05 First, the clarification codified an exemption
102. Id. The Court determined that the term "otherwise managing" did not
include the activity of generating hazardous waste. Id. Because Congress failed to
provide a statutory definition of "otherwise managing," the Court looked to an
analogous term defined by RCRA. Id. (citing RCRA § 1004(7), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(7)). The Court noted that the definition of "hazardous waste manage-
ment" does not include the generation of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(7). For the text of this definition, see supra note 42.
103. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593. Chicago relied on Senate Report No. 98-284
to demonstrate Congress' intention to promote resource recovery facilities by ex-
empting all their activities from Subtitle C regulation. Petitioners' Brief, supra
note 90, at 21-22 (citing S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess. 61 (1983)).
104. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593. To further support the contention that Con-
gress would have included the word "generating" in the statute if incinerator ash
was to be exempted, the Court cited an example of an exemption in RCRA which
explicitly included references to generating. Id. at 1593 (citing Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 124(b), 100 Stat.
1689 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6921)).
Superfund legislation was amended to read that an "owner and operator of
equipment used to recover methane from a landfill shall not be deemed to be
managing, generating, transporting, treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous
... wastes within the meaning of Subtitle C." Id. The Court quoted a recent
decision: " '[I] t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely' when it 'includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another.'" Id. at 1593 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035,
2040 (1993)). Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded that when Congress
intends to exempt an activity from regulation, Congress knows exactly how to do it.
Id.
105. Id. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 90, at 20. Ash residue is the only
waste disposed of in large quantities, and is the only potentially hazardous waste
that is collected, stored and disposed of by resource recovery facilities. Id. Incom-
ing household waste is already exempt from Subtitle C regulation because of EPA's
"household waste exclusion." Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text. As
applied to resource recovery facilities, "the only meaningful exemption [the clarifi-
cation provision] provides is an exemption for the ash remaining after incinera-
tion." Petitioners' Brief, supra note 90, at 12.
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that had previously been subject to revision. 0 6 Second, it restricted
the exemption to waste not generated by incinerators.' 0 7
The Court also rejected Chicago's contention that construing
the clarification provision not to cover incinerator ash rendered the
provision ineffective for the intended purpose of promoting re-
source recovery facilities. 108 The Court reasserted its determination
that Chicago's facility was a "hazardous waste generator," and that
hazardous waste generation is distinct from hazardous waste
management.109
4. RCRA Policy Objectives
The Court treated RCRA's two main goals of encouraging re-
source recovery and protecting against contamination as conflict-
ing, explaining that it "is not unusual for legislation to contain
diverse purposes that must be reconciled."" 0 According to the
Court, resolution of this conflict could be accomplished solely by a
reading of the enacted text."' Thus, reference to any source
outside the statute, including EPA's stated position and the legisla-
tive history, was not necessary." 2 For the foregoing reasons, the
Court declined to interpret the provision to permit incinerator ash
to be regulated as a non-hazardous waste.
C. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens concluded that incinerator ash was not in-
tended to be regulated as a hazardous waste, focusing on the pur-
pose of the clarification provision as indicated by the regulatory
and legislative history of incinerator ash."13 Because he found am-
biguity in the text of the clarification provision, Stevens gave defer-
106. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Petitioners' Brief, supra note 90, at 18. The City of Chicago
relied on RCRA's statement of objectives and the congressional findings upon
which the objectives were based in asserting that Congress intended, through
RCRA, to encourage resource recovery facilities. Id. For the text of these provi-
sions, see supra note 27.
109. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593-94. If, according to the Court's construction,
the incinerator was deemed to be managing incinerator ash, the exemption would
then apply.
110. Id. For the two goals of RCRA, see supra note 27.
111. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593-94.
112. Id. For the Court's treatment of EPA's interpretation of the darification
provision, see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
113. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1596, 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ence to both the Senate Report and EPA's stated position on
incinerator ash.' 14
Based on the Senate Committee's Report," 5 the dissent con-
cluded that the clarification provision was intended solely to clarify
the "household waste exclusion's" applicability to non-hazardous
waste from sources other than households, namely commercial and
industrial non-hazardous wastes." 6 The dissent also deferred to
EPA's interpretation of the clarification provision." 7 Given the am-
114. Id. at 1596-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens even suggested
that the clarification provision was more ambiguous than the legislation it was
designed to clarify. "The relevant statutory text is not as unambiguous as the Court
asserts." Id. at 1597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens regarded the September, 1992 Memorandum as EPA's last
stated position. Id. at 1598 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Memorandum, supra
note 53.
115. For the text of the Senate report, see supra note 45.
116. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1595-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
first examined EPA's 1980 household waste exclusion and ascertained the need for
a clarification. Id. at 1595 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Following from this need,
along with the Senate Report's indication that the exclusion was not intended to
be narrowed, Justice Stevens inferred that Congress, at a minimum, intended to
retain the exemption provided in the 1980 regulation. Id. at 1595-97 (Stevens, J,
dissenting). The House Committee Report provided further confirmation of this
intent. Id. at 1597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the text of the House Committee
Report, see supra note 45. Justice Stevens commented on this legislative history:
Given this commentary, it is quite unrealistic to assume that the omission
of the word "generating" from the particularized description of manage-
ment activities in the statute was intended to render the statutory descrip-
tion any less inclusive than either the 1980 regulation or the Committee
Report. It is even more unrealistic to assume that legislators voting on
the 1984 amendment would have detected any difference between the
statutory text and the Committee's summary just because the term "gen-
erating" does not appear in the 1984 amendment. A common-sense
reading of the statutory text in the light of the Committee Report and
against the background of the 1980 regulation reveals an obvious pur-
pose to preserve, not change, the existing rule.
Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The dissent also noted that inclusion of the word "clarification" in the name
of Congress' enacted provision, as opposed to a term such as "repeal or modifica-
tion," was an indication of Congress' intent to retain the general parameters of the
1980 exclusion. Id. at 1596, 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent did ac-
knowledge that there had been "some ambivalence in EPA's views but recognized
that there was no ambiguity or equivocation in either its [EPA's] original or its
present interpretation of the Act." Id. at 1598 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also explained that although the majority's holding may "rep-
resent sound policy," this decision may be beyond the scope of the Court's func-
tion. Id. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The question of whether "environmental
benefits may ... justify the costs of such additional regulation are questions of
policy that we [the Court] are not competent to resolve." Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). These questions are "precisely the kind that Congress has directed the EPA
to answer." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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biguous nature of the clarification provision and the legislative and
regulatory history of RCRA, this interpretation was reasonable.118
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIs: C=rz OF CHICAGO v. EDF
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Language of the
Clarification Provision
The Chicago Court erred in treating the language of the clarifi-
cation provision as unambiguous."19 The language of this provi-
sion, contrary to its name, lacks clarity. The provision does not
indicate whether a resource recovery facility is exempt from haz-
ardous waste regulation before and/or after it receives and burns
the household waste. Additionally, neither the words "ash residue"
nor "ash" are mentioned in the statute. Finally, applying RCRA's
statutory definitions to the text of the provision does not resolve the
question of whether the remaining ash is exempt' 20
In an effort to avoid the legislative history of the clarification
provision, the Chicago Court focused on the statutory definitions of
the activities enumerated in the provision.' 21 The Court assumed
that burning municipal solid waste falls within the statutory defini-
tion of "hazardous waste generation."122 This assumption led the
Court to incorrectly conclude that because the word "generating" is
not included within the categories of exempted activities, incinera-
tor ash is also not included in the exemption.' 2 3
118. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Based on the clarification's legislative his-
tory, "EPA could reasonably conclude, therefore, that to give any content to the
statute with respect to this component of the waste stream [non-hazardous com-
mercial and industrial waste], the incinerator ash must be exempted from Subtitle
C regulation." Id. at 1597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens supports this construction by citing Judge Haight's opinion in
Wheelabrator. Id. at 1598 (Stevens,J, dissenting) ("It is the construction that reason-
able jurists have accepted.").
119. For the text of the clarification provision, see supra note 15.
120. Justice Stevens, in the dissent, finds ambiguity in the definition of "haz-
ardous waste generation." Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1597 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (citing RCRA § 1004(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (6)).
121. These activities are the treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise man-
aging hazardous, waste. RCRA § 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i). For the statutory
definitions of these activities, see supra note 42.
122. For the statutory definition of "hazardous waste generation," see supra
note 100.
123. Justice Stevens called this approach unrealistic in light of the legislative
history of the clarification provision. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Additionally, the dissent stated that "lIt] he omission of the single word 'gener-
ating' from the statute has no more significance than the omission of the same
word from the text of the 1980 regulation." Id. at 1597 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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There are two inherent problems with the Court's use of these
statutory definitions. First, the term "otherwise managing" was dis-
missed by the Court as not including the management of incinera-
tor ash. Second, even if the term "otherwise managing" is not
construed to include the management of ash, the term "disposing
of" may be reasonably interpreted to apply to the incinerator oper-
ator's disposal of ash.
Because there is no statutory definition for "otherwise manag-
ing," the Court used the definition of "hazardous waste manage-
ment" as set forth in the original 1976 enactment of RCRA. 124
According to this definition, "hazardous waste management" does
not include generating hazardous waste. As a result, the Court con-
cluded that the phrase "otherwise managing" could not have been
meant to include the "generation" of incinerator ash.
Again the Court based its conclusion on the unsound assump-
tion that incinerators "generate" hazardous waste. Further, the def-
inition used, that of "hazardous waste management," logically
referred to activities that occur after hazardous waste is generated.
Thus, the term "generation" was not necessary when defining "haz-
ardous waste management" because the hazardous waste had al-
ready been generated. Nevertheless, the Court relied upon this
outdated definition of "hazardous waste management" to support
its conclusion that incinerator ash was not exempted from Subtitle
C.1 2 5
The Court also overlooked a possible construction of the clari-
fication provision based on the phrase "disposing of." This phrase
was interpreted by the Court to refer to the trash received by an
incinerator and not the remaining ash. The Court looked to the
definition of the term "disposal" to support this contention; 126 how-
ever, the Court failed to address the possibility that the phrase "dis-
posing of" may refer to a resource recovery facility's disposal of the
remaining ash residue. 127 This is yet another possible interpreta-
tion of the clarification provision, further supporting the assertion
that the provision is ambiguous.
124. For the statutory definition of "hazardous waste management," see supra
note 42.
125. In 1976, the disposal of incinerator ash was not an issue. Residues re-
maining after incineration were first regulated by EPA in 1980 when regulations
were promulgated pursuant to RCRA. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying
texL
126. For the statutory definition of "disposal," see supra note 42.
127. Justice Stevens' opinion supports this construction, noting that the activ-
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B. Legislative and Administrative History of the Clarification
Provision
Principles of statutory interpretation require that if a statute is
ambiguous, the court must look beyond the language of the stat-
ute.1 28 Because the clarification provision is ambiguous, the Court
erred by not giving weight to its legislative and regulatory history.
12
The Senate Committee Report accompanying the clarification pro-
vision suggested Congress' desire to exempt all incinerator activities
from Subtitle C regulation. 3 0 As noted in the dissent, this report
does not manifest an intent to subject the waste-to-energy incinera-
tor industry to significantly increased costs.' 3 '
The Senate Committee Report stated that resource recovery fa-
cilities that accept non-hazardous commercial waste in addition to
household waste are exempt from Subtitle C regulation. 3 2 The
1980 regulations promulgated by EPA were unclear on this precise
issue.' 3 3 In light of this provision's title, and the Senate Report's
statements regarding the purpose of the clarification provision, it is
clear that Congress intended to include incinerator ash in the
household waste exclusion.
128. John Paul Stevens, Essay, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction,
140 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1373, 1374-81 (1992) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
The five canons of statutory interpretation are the following: read the statute,
read the entire statute, read the statute in its contemporary context, consult the
legislative history of the statute, and determine whether the possible interpretation
is reasonable in light of the legislature's intentions. See Stevens, supra, at 1374-83.
129. Instead of deferring to the legislative history of the clarification provi-
sion, the Court stated that the statute was the "authoritative expression of the law."
Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593.
The Court barely mentions EPA's interpretation of the clarification, stating
only that EPA's interpretation went "beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [the
clarification provision] contains." Id. at 1594.
As rebutted in Justice Stevens' dissent, the majority's failure to attach any im-
portance to the clarification provision's legislative history reflects "a lack of respect
for the function of legislative committees." Id. at 1597 n.7.
130. S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1983). For the text of the
Senate report, see supra note 45.
131. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1598 (StevensJ., dissenting).Justice Stevens reads
the Senate report as emphasizing "the importance of encouraging commercially
viable resource recovery facilities." Id. at 1596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Justice Stevens relies heavily on this report in determining that Congress
intended to preserve the 1980 exemption. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
133. The dissent finds this lack of clarity in EPA's 1980 regulations obvious.
Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1595 (StevensJ, dissenting) ("The EPA's failure to comment
expressly on the significance of adding 100 percent non-hazardous commercial or
industrial waste nevertheless warranted further clarification."); see also supra note
113-18 and accompanying text.
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C. EPA's Interpretation of the Clarification Provision
The Court afforded no deference to EPA's interpretation of
the clarification provision. The Chevron principles governing judi-
cial review of an administrative agency's statutory construction were
dismissed by the Court as inapplicable because the Court read the
clarification statute as unambiguous.134 Under Chevron, it is not
necessary to look to the agency's interpretation where Congress has
spoken directly on the specific issue in question.13 5 Here, however,
Congress did not specifically address the regulation of incinerator
ash.13 6 Therefore, Chevron. required the Court to look to the
agency's interpretation and determine whether it was "based on a
permissible construction of the statute." 37
The Court avoided EPA's interpretation of the clarification
provision because it went "beyond the scope of [the provision's]
ambiguity."' 38 On the contrary, EPA's interpretation of the clarifi-
cation provision was a plausible interpretation of the statute.'3 9 If
the Court had considered the statute's legislative and administrative
history, EPA's interpretation would have been deemed a rational
approach. Instead, the Court relied solely on the enacted text
based on the premise that statutory language is the "most reliable
guide" for determining congressional intent.140
While EPA had changed its position on incinerator ash, this
inconsistency can be attributed to Congress' own wavering on the
issue. Any equivocation was inevitable due to Congress' failure to
directly address the issue of incinerator ash. Furthermore, as noted
in Justice Stevens' dissent, EPA's September, 1992 memorandum
134. For a statement of the Chevron principles, see supra note 67. The
Supreme Court in Chevron recognized that the judiciary has the final word on is-
sues of statutory interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. An administrative
agency's construction of a statute will be rejected where it is "contrary to dear
congressional intent." Id.
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
136. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the clarification provision, see supra
notes 119-127 and accompanying text.
137. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. "The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 843 n.11.
138. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1594.
139. See Memorandum, supra note 53. The memorandum stated EPA's position
that incinerator ash was exempt from Subtitle C regulation. See id. Justice Stevens,
writing for the dissent, considers this reasonable. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1598 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
140. Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1594.
1995]
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was consistent with EPA's first adopted position as set forth in its
1980 regulations. 141
D. Objectives of RCRA
The Chicago Court's holding is inconsistent with the broad pol-
icy goals of RCRA. 142 Although the Court paid superficial defer-
ence to RCRA's objectives, the Court selectively focused on only
one objective: the regulation of hazardous waste. The Court failed
to consider the role of resource recovery in Congress' environmen-
tal protection scheme.' 43 Nowhere in the clarification provision,
RCRA, or the provision's legislative history is there any indication
that Congress intended to subordinate the promotion of resource
recovery to the regulation of hazardous waste.
The Court's approach also ignored the congressional findings
upon which RCRA is based.'4 In enacting RCRA, Congress recog-
nized that the country was in the midst of a waste disposal crisis
because landfills were not as safe as previously thought.145 Conse-
quently, Congress adopted policies to encourage alternative means
of waste disposal, such as those which would produce energy from
solid waste. Had Congress' findings been appropriately considered,
the Court would have reached an opposite conclusion regarding
incinerator ash.
141. Id. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 67 (quoting Chev-
ron, 47 U.S. at 843).
142. RCRA § 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a); see also supra note 27.
143. In its conclusion, the Court noted that RCRA's objectives "sometimes
conflict." Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1594. For a statement of the objectives of RCRA,
see supra note 27.
144. The Court did not consider the list of eighteen congressional findings
with respect to solid waste, environment and health, materials and energy. RCRA
§ 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901. For the text of these findings, see supra note 27.
145. Among its findings, Congress stated that waste disposal had become a
national problem which required federal assistance "in the development, demon-
stration, and application of new and improved methods and processes to reduce
the amount of waste and unsalvageable materials and to provide for proper and
economical solid waste disposal practices." RCRA § 1002(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 (a) (4). Additionally, Congress found that because existing landfills could
not provide reliable long-term containment of solid waste, alternative methods of
disposal had to be developed. Id. § 1002(b)(7)-(8), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(7)-(8).
With respect to energy, Congress stated that "technology exists to produce usable
energy from solid waste." Id. § 1002(d) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(d) (3).
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V. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
A. Practical Implications
The Chicago decision will severely increase the cost of waste-to-
energy incineration. 146 This expense will be incurred by municipal-
ities, and derivatively by local taxpayers. 147 Incinerator operators
will now be required to test all incinerator ash for toxicity.148 If the
ash exceeds certain criteria, it will be deemed hazardous and, con-
sequently, will have to be disposed of in hazardous waste land-
fills.149 Some commentators have predicted a decline in the
number of operational incinerators if this cost is too high. 50
Adding to the expense problem is EPA's inadequate guidance
regarding how to handle the ash.' 5 ' Because EPA decided not to
seek a stay of the decision, the holding of Chicago took effect ap-
146. Costs will increase for this nation's 171 waste-to-energy incinerators in
three ways. DeLong, supra note 2, at 8. First, testing of ash is now required to
determine if hazardous constituents are present. Id.; see also supra note 19. Sec-
ond, application of hazardous waste restrictions to incinerator ash will result in
incentives for expensive overcompliance. DeLong, supra note 2, at 8-9. For exam-
ple, if there is a slight chance that a small sample of incinerator ash may test posi-
tive for toxicity, an incinerator operator will be forced to treat the whole batch as
hazardous waste. Id. Third, incinerator ash that exceeds toxicity levels must be
treated as a hazardous waste. Id. at 9. This ash will have to be stabilized and dis-
posed of in a hazardous waste landfill. Id.
Before the Chicago decision, ash was dumped in non-hazardous waste landfills
or special landfills designed specifically for ash at a cost of $30 to $50 per ton.
Keith Schneider, Incinerator Operators Say Ruling Will Be Costly, N.Y. TIMEs, May 3,
1994, at A18. The disposal of ash in hazardous waste landfills pursuant to the
Chicago decision will cost between $200 and $500 a ton. Id.
147. Landfills are now a much less expensive option. The average "tipping
fee," the cost waste haulers pay to dump municipal solid waste at landfills, is $20.36
per ton. Groff, supra note 5, at 555 n.1 (citations omitted). Local governments will
be most affected by the additional costs because under most standard contracts
between municipalities and incinerator operators, it is the local government's re-
sponsibility to pay for testing, treatment and disposal of the incinerator ash. Slants
and Trends: Those Hardest Hit by the U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling This Week, SOLID
WAsTE REPORT, May 5, 1994, at 1.
148. See supra note 19 (describing testing procedures under Subtitle C).
149. See id.
150. SeeJeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading Garbage Crisis Leaves Incinerators Compet-
ing for Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at Al (predicting closure of municipal
incinerators and bond defaults as result of unfavorable ruling on incinerator ash);
DeLong, supra note 2, at 12-14 (questioning viability of waste-to-energy incinera-
tors in light of competition from less expensive landfills and non-energy producing
incinerators).
151. After the Chicago decision, EPA officials issued a guidance document ti-
fled "Sampling and Analysis of Municipal Refuse Incineration Ash." This docu-
ment "explains how to design a sampling plan and criteria for evaluating data to
determine if the ash passes EPA's toxicity characteristic." EPA Requests Comments
On Draft About How To Test Incinerator Ash, SLUDGE, July 5, 1994, at 1 (criticizing
draft for its inconsistency with previous EPA guidance documents and lack of clar-
ity and fairness).
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proximately one month after the date of the decision.' 52 However,
EPA has granted a reprieve to incinerator operators by designating
ash as a "newly identified waste."1 53 As a result of this designation,
EPA had six months from the date of announcement to promulgate
regulations specifically for ash.' 54 Additionally, the "newly identi-
fied waste" status may overcome possible liability problems for in-
cinerator ash that has already been disposed of as non-hazardous
waste under Subtitle D.155
The Chicago decision will strain the already scarce hazardous
waste landfill space.15 6 Costs will increase for municipalities that do
not have access to a hazardous waste dump and will be forced to
transport their ash to remote dump sites. Using hazardous waste
landfill space for a high volume material such as incinerator ash will
substantially speed the closing of these dumps.
Because of the Chicago decision's detrimental effects on the in-
cinerator industry and the paucity of landfill space, municipalities
will be forced to look for alternative methods of waste disposal. As
See also EPA's Incinerator Ash Guidance Plays to Mixed Reviews, HAZARD OUS WASTE
NEWS, May 30, 1994, at 1 ("The agency dearly wants solid waste chaos in
America."); Hazel Bradford & Ichniowski, EPA Guidance on Ash, Sort Of WASHING-
TON OBSERVER, May 30, 1994, at 5 ("to the regulated community, there are more
questions than answers").
152. EPA Moving Rapidly To Develop Hazardous Ash Guidance, ENVIRONMENT
WEEK, May 26, 1994, at 21 (discussing EPA's "aggressive compliance schedule").
Since the Chicago decision, a trade association of companies which builds mu-
nicipal waste incinerators, the Integrated Waste Services Association ("IWSA"), has
sought review of EPA's new requirements tinder Subtitle C. Municipal Incinerator
Ash Policy Challenged in Court, PFSTICIDE & Toxic C-mMIcAL NEws, Aug. 31, 1994, at
44. IWSA has filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that EPA already concluded in 1992 that
incinerator ash could be safely managed as a non-hazardous waste and that this
position has not changed. Id. IWSA also argues that EPA's reluctance to give in-
cinerator operators adequate time to comply is unlawful, arbitrary and capricious.
Id.
153. Extension of Date for Submission of Part A Permit Applications for Facil-
ities Managing Ash From Waste-to-Energy Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 29,373 (1994).
154. Id.
155. Delong, supra note 2, at 7. With respect to newly identified wastes, RCRA
generally does not subject regulated parties to retroactive liability where the par-
ties have complied with the law as it existed at the time of the disposal. Id. How-
ever, reliance on incinerator ash's "newly identified waste" status may be risky
because there has been only one prior case where a material which had been
treated as exempt was subsequently brought under RCRA regulations by a court.
See id. at 8; 59 Fed. Reg. 29,375 (1994).
For a discussion of possible liability of incinerator operators under CERCLA,
see Wartinbee, supra note 4, at 131-35 (criticizing Wheelabrator court and EPA's
inconsistencies and predicting future CERCLA liabiity for incinerator operators).
156. See Groff, supra note 5, at 584-85.
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a result, programs aimed at reducing waste through recycling and
public awareness may become more prevalent. 157
B. Legal Implications
In light of two competing objectives, Congress chose to pro-
mote waste-to-energy incineration by exempting incinerator ash
from costly Subtitle C regulation. 58 Although Chicago appears to
be the long awaited resolution of the incinerator ash issue, this
holding will seriously undermine previous congressional efforts to
make incinerators the primary means of municipal waste disposal.
The Supreme Court refused to accept clear congressional in-
tent and instead, rendered its opinion largely based on public
health and environmental policy concerns which should be left to
the discretion of Congress. In so doing, the Court ignored estab-
lished principles of statutory interpretation by disregarding the leg-
islative history and congressional findings upon which RCRA is
based.
In the future, EPA interpretation and implementation of
RCRA may present a problem to the Supreme Court because Chi-
cago establishes precedent which diminishes the importance of leg-
islative and administrative history. Where an executive agency is
given authority to promulgate regulations requiring special exper-
tise, the agency'sjudgment should be given weight. If courts do not
defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute, the
agency's authority will become questionable and its regulations will
be increasingly vulnerable to attack.
There is also speculation that Congress purposely drafted the
clarification provision ambiguously to placate special interests, leav-
ing the real burden of clarification on the courts. If this is the case,
Congress undoubtedly has shirked its responsibility as a lawmaking
body. However, the lack of specific direction from Congress on an
issue such as incinerator ash does not justify a court's intrusion on
the legislative function. 59 Although the judicial function includes
statutory interpretation, policymaking is beyond the scope of this
function. The reasoning behind the Chicago holding places the re-
spective roles of Congress and the judiciary in doubt.
157. For a discussion of the benefits of recycling, see GoRE, supra note 1, at
158-59. But see Groff, supra note 5, at 14-15 (predicting that trash diverted from
incinerators will end up in landfills, not recycling programs).
158. For the two policy objectives of RCRA, see supra note 27.
159. For further discussion of the view that the Chicago decision intrudes on
the policymaking function of Congress, see Groff, supra note 5, at 586-88.
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C. Future Legislation?
The majority holding in Chicago leaves a primary method of
waste disposal for this country hanging in the balance. This hold-
ing also reveals a reluctant Congress with respect to a significant
concern- where to dispose of the nation's ever-increasing volume
of trash. Congress still has the power to correct this situation. En-
acting legislation which specifically covers the regulation of inciner-
ator ash would further RCRA's goals of promoting resource
recovery while safely disposing of the nation's waste. 160 Most im-
portantly, legislation targeting incinerator ash would minimize
compliance costs for incinerators and leave no unanswered ques-
tions in the process. 161
Emily Abbott
160. Currently, EPA is considering a proposal for the regulation of incinera-
tor ash submitted by EDF. EDF Drafts Legislation in Effort to Ensure Incinerator Ash
Safety, HAzmwous WAsTE NEws, July 4, 1994, at 27. This proposal directs "that all
incinerator ash be disposed of in specifically designed monofills, thereby negating
the need for costly and possibly ineffective testing." Id.
This proposal went to Representative Al Swift (D-Wash.), Chairman of the
House Energy Subcommittee on Tranportation and Hazardous Materials. Incinera-
tor Ash Proposal Will Go to Rep. Swift, Congress This Week, SOLID WASTE REpORT, Aug.
11, 1994, at 1. A bill based on this proposal is predicted to have wide support from
both municipalities and incinerator operators. Id.
161. Costs of compliance with the Chicago decision would be reduced by legis-
lation which allowed disposal of ash in specially designed monofills without testing.
If ash could be disposed of safely without the costly testing procedure required by
Subtitle C, incinerators would be able to continue as a viable waste disposal alter-
native. See EDFDrafts Legislation in Effort to Ensure Incinerator Ash Safety, HLz7nous
WASTE NEws, July 4, 1994, at 27.
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